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Special
Report
No. 142

Documents on the Nicaraguan Resistance: Leaders, Military Personnel, and Program

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This Special Report contains a collection of basic documents and data pertaining to the character of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. The purpose of this Report is to partially answer the question: "who" is the democratic resistance?

These documents provide an insight into the debate about the relationship between civilian and military leaders within the resistance, about the organizational nature of resistance military forces (especially those of the FDN), and about the political programs of those struggling for freedom against the Soviet-equipped and Cuban-advised Sandinista dictatorship.

Document 1

Letter from Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams to Senator Richard G. Lugar (Ind.), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 24, 1986

February 24, 1986

Dear Mr. Chairman:

You asked about the allegation that the Nicaraguan resistance consists of, or is led by, supporters of the late dictator Anastasio Somoza. We have reviewed the facts carefully and conclude that this charge is incorrect and misleading.

The leaders of the main resistance organization, the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), are Adolfo Calero,

Background of Senior FDN Military Personnel, November 1985



Total Civilian 53%
Total National Guard 27%
Total Sandinista 20%

Source: Document I, Table 1.

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Arturo Cruz, and Alfonso Robelo. All three actively opposed Somoza while he was still in power. Calero was jailed by Somoza; first Robelo then Cruz became Junta members with the Sandinistas.

The largest guerrilla forces belong to the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), headed by Calero since 1983. Other important resistance organizations include ARDE, built by Robelo and former Sandinista Comandante Eden Pastora, and MISURASATA and KISAN guerrillas active among the Indians of the Atlantic Coast.

We expect the UNO coalition to continue to broaden, both inside and outside of Nicaragua, but UNO is already far more representative of the wishes of the Nicaraguan people than Somoza ever was or than the Sandinistas are today.

Resistance fighters are overwhelmingly rural youths. Most are between 18 and 22 years old; when Somoza fell in 1979, they were in their early teens. They fight today in response to Sandinista attempts to control their farming, their churches, and in some cases their indigenous cultures. Many joined the resistance in preference to being drafted to fight for the Sandinistas against their friends and neighbors. In defending their families and communities, these young Nicaraguans are fighting for self-determination above all else. Their struggle is not on behalf of the old dictatorship—it is against the new dictatorship armed by Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The commanders are older than their troops (most are 25–35), are more likely to come from urban areas, and have more diverse occupations and backgrounds. They include both former National Guardsmen and former Sandinista fighters, but most are civilians from the very groups the Sandinistas claim to represent: peasants, small farmers, urban professionals, and students. One was a primary school teacher; another, an evangelical pastor. Even in the FDN, which has the largest number of former military professionals, less than half the commanders have prior military experience, either in the National Guard under Somoza or in the army, militia, or security services under the Sandinistas.

We have obtained information on the backgrounds of all senior FDN military leaders, including the incumbents of every position from the civil-military command down to task force deputy commander or executive officer. The results, based on a November 1985 survey, are summarized in Table I, below. Allowing for casualties, transfers, and other personnel changes, we believe that this general pattern holds today.

Acronyms

KISAN—Nicaraguan East Coast Indian Unity
UNO—United Nicaraguan Opposition
FDN—Nicaraguan Democratic Forces
FRS—Sandino Revolutionary Front
MDN—Nicaraguan Democratic Movement
ARDE—Democratic Revolutionary Alliance
FARN—Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed Force
MISURASATA—Miskito, Sumo, Rama, and Sandinista Unity
MISURA—Miskito, Sumo, and Rama
EPS—Sandinista Popular Army
MPS—Sandinista Popular Militia

TABLE I

Prior Occupations of Senior FDN Military Leaders

Civilian	78
Professionals or urban employees	39
Peasants or small farmers	34
Students	5
Military	71
National Guard	41
Officers	23
Soldiers	18
Sandinista army, militia, or security services	30
Officers	8
Soldiers	22
No information available	4
TOTAL	153

While accepting that most FDN fighters are peasants, a report prepared last year for the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus (*Who are the Contras?*, April 18, 1985) claimed that the FDN "army is organized and commanded by former National Guardsmen." This allegation, though false, has become almost an article of faith for many who oppose U.S. support for the Nicaraguan resistance.

The Caucus staff claimed that "46 of the 48 positions in the FDN's command structure are held by former Guardsmen." "[A]ll but one of the 12 top central staff" and "five out of six regional commanders, and all 30 task force commanders" were said to be Guardsmen.

The Caucus staff is correct in identifying the FDN's military commander, Enrique Bermudez, as a former Guard officer. It is also correct in describing the FDN's regional and task force commanders as "the key military field leaders." But the report's overall figures and conclusions are incorrect.

The FDN has 14 regional commands (each has roughly 800 combatants organized into 2 to 4 task forces). At the time of the survey, the FDN had 52 task forces or equivalent commands (task forces have from 60 to 700 members). Tables II and III show the backgrounds of the regional and task force commanders. They are based on the same data as Table I.

TABLE II

Prior Occupations of FDN Regional Commanders

Sandinista Soldiers	6
National Guard Soldiers	2
Peasants or Small Farmers	2
National Guard Officer	1
Civilian Medical Doctor	1
Evangelical Pastor	1
Student	1
TOTAL	14

Rather than 5 of 6 regional commanders being former Guard members as asserted in the Caucus report, we find 3 of 14.

TABLE III

Prior Occupations of Commanders of FDN Task Forces or Equivalent Commands

Peasants or Small Farmers	19
National Guard	14
Officers	5
Soldiers	9
Sandinista Army or Militia	13
Officers	4
Soldiers	9
Medical Student	1
No Information	4
Vacant	1
TOTAL	52

Whereas the Caucus report claimed that 30 out of 30 task force commanders were former Guardsmen, we find that 14 out of 47 did have prior Guard service, but that 33, more than twice as many, never served in the Guard in any capacity.

FDN headquarters links the strong-willed and independent field commanders who control the troops with the UNO political leadership. The Caucus claim of 11 former Guardsmen in 12 top positions omitted several positions held by persons who were not former Guardsmen. A complete count must include all members of the strategic and civil-military commands, all operational commanders, and all chiefs of support services. Of the 21 individuals in these positions late last year, 12 (including Bermudez) once served in the Guard. A former Sandinista Army officer and eight civilians from professional or tech-



nical backgrounds held the other key positions.

As noted above, it is true that the FDN's military commander was in the National Guard. But it is wrong to call Enrique Bermudez a backer of Somoza. Somoza had him posted out of Nicaragua during the last three years of his regime. Not even the Sandinistas accused Bermudez of human rights abuses under Somoza. In 1979, Somoza rejected a Carter Administration suggestion that Bermudez, then a colonel, might assume command of the National Guard after Somoza's departure.

The presence in the resistance of men like Bermudez seems unobjectionable unless one is seeking to deny to the resistance the services of all former Guardsmen simply because they once served in the Guard. That is a standard not followed by the Sandinistas themselves, who have used former Guardsmen together with Cuban, Soviet and other foreign advisors and technicians to consolidate their power on the basis of a pervasive military security apparatus.

* * *

The Sandinista armed forces are the largest and best equipped in the history of Central America. They are at least six times larger than the armed forces of any of the Somozas at their height.

Although the Sandinistas frequently portray themselves as nationalists, their soldiers are trained and supported in combat by thousands of Cubans and other foreigners known as "internationalists." When Daniel Ortega spoke in Havana on February 5 to the Congress of the Cuban Communist Party about "the blood of Cuban internationalists fallen on Nicaraguan ground," he was talking about Cubans killed fighting Nicaraguans inside Nicaragua.

Resistance to the Sandinistas and to their Cuban and other foreign allies is eroding past differences and gradually forging a new national coalition similar to the one that rose up against Somoza. In the early days, who fought with whom typically depended on relationships that went back to the Somoza era. When Pastora, for example, first took up arms against his former comrades, he refused to have anything to do with former Guardsmen or with anyone else who had not been actively Sandinista at least for a time. The increased coordination within UNO between ARDE commanders associated with Pastora and FDN commanders also operating on the southern front is therefore a significant change.

More must be done to improve the human rights performance of the armed resistance (UNO has begun a program one of whose objectives is to assign at least one fully trained person in human rights to every task force). More must be done politically to develop, articulate, and coordinate the programs of the armed resistance with those of the civil opposition.

Sandinista abuses have aroused entire sectors of the population. Some FDN units are made up of men from the same cluster of villages or the same department. Other units reflect a new Nicaraguan nationalism: Four of the fourteen regional commands have among their commanders both former Guard and former Sandinista military personnel. In three of the four, former Sandinista military personnel outrank (and hence give orders to) former Guardsmen.

To continue to associate Nicaragua's resistance forces with Somoza is patently misleading. Somoza is dead. The Central American dictatorships associated with Somoza have all given way to elected governments committed to democracy. Today, the only Central American President who wears a military uniform is the Sandinista president of Nicaragua.

We join with the Nicaraguan democratic resistance forces and the people of Nicaragua in our commitment

to a democratic outcome for that country. The people of Nicaragua and the resistance forces are struggling for a future of freedom and peace, and they deserve our support.

Sincerely,

ELLIOTT ABRAMS

Document 2

Letter from Senator Claiborne Pell (R.I.), Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to Assistant Secretary Abrams, March 4, 1986

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This regards your recent letter to Senator Lugar commenting on the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus' report of last April, entitled "Who Are the Contras?" As you may know, I have been interested in receiving information from the Department on the make-up of the military leadership of the FDN. I am encouraged that the Department is now addressing the issue, and agree that it is a legitimate and important topic of debate.

I am interested to read in your report that, although you dispute certain of the Caucus' conclusions, you do confirm its staff's finding of last spring that there is substantial involvement in the FDN military leadership of ex-National Guardsmen. Specifically, you determine—as indeed did its staff—that over 40 of the FDN command were formerly members of Somoza's National Guard.

I am disturbed, however, that your report is both incomplete and at times inconsistent with past assertions of your Administration.

It is incomplete because it fails to include the names, titles or backgrounds of any military leader other than Enrique Bermudez, thus precluding the Caucus' staff and other analysts from verifying its conclusions. And it is inconsistent in that it appears directly to contradict at least one key finding of your predecessor, Langhorne Motley: last spring, he confirmed that nine of ten of the FDN General Staff were ex-Guardsmen; in contrast, your report neglects so much as to mention a General Staff. In addition, it greatly expands Ambassador Motley's definition of military leadership well past the command level to include lower-ranking "civil-military" personnel and task force deputies. This seems to more than double (from 66 to 153) the leadership total, and artificially reduces the percentage of former Guards.

Since the Administration has requested mostly *military* rather than "humanitarian" aid this year, and since, therefore, it is the *military* leaders of the contras who will be the actual recipients of the aid, I would appreciate precise and specific responses to the following questions about the military leadership of the FDN:

(1) Who served on the ten-member General Staff referred to in Ambassador Motley's letter last April, and who now holds their title or duty?

(2) Are nine of the ten-member General Staff still, as Ambassador Motley confirmed in the letter, former members of the National Guard?

(3) Is Walter "Tono" Calderon Lopez coordinating the regional commands as commander of theater operations? (For questions 3–9, if this individual is not serving in the position, where is he serving, if at all?)

(4) Is "El Venado" serving as G–1, General Staff commander for personnel?

(5) Is "El Toro" serving as G–2, General Staff commander for personnel?

(6) Is "Mike Lima" serving as G–3, General Staff commander for operations?

(7) Is Armando "El Policia" Lopez serving as G–4, General Staff commander for logistics?

(8) Is "El Invisible" serving as G–5, General Staff commander for logistics?

(9) Is Juan Gomez serving as commander of air operations?

(10) What is the current role in the FDN and whereabouts of Ricardo Lau, who press reports placed in contra camps as recently as last month?

(11) Who commands the 14 regional commands cited in your letter to Senator Lugar, and what is the name of each command?

(12) Who commands the 52 task forces cited in your letter to Senator Lugar, and what is the name of each task force?

(13) Who are the roughly 75 individuals tabulated in your letter to Senator Lugar who are neither General Staff, regional commanders or task force commanders, and what are their specific titles or duties?

(14) What are the positions and who are the occupants of the leadership posts referred to in the chart entitled "Background of FDN Military Leaders: Late 1985" that accompanied Secretary Shultz's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 27?

Biographical information on individuals you will be naming in your response would also be of use.

Since Congress will be voting on the aid request later this month, we would hope a response to these questions could be provided prior to March 11.

Thank you for your attention to this request.

Sincerely,

CLAIBORNE PELL
Ranking Minority Member

Document 3

Letter from Assistant Secretary Abrams to Senator Pell, March 14, 1986

Dear Senator Pell:

I agree fully that accurate information on the military leaders of the FDN is important to the debate over U.S. policy in Central America. I welcome the opportunity to answer your questions of March 4.

Let me first say, however, that our identifying 41 out of 153 members of the FDN senior personnel as former Guardsmen does not confirm the principal contention of the April 1985 Caucus staff report that the FDN "army is organized and commanded by former National Guardsmen."

Allowing for growth and force expansion, but counting the positions performing the same functions the Caucus report used to base its claim that 46 out of 48 were former Guardsmen, we found 29 former Guards out of 82 individuals whose backgrounds were identified. Thirty-five per cent is *not* the same as 96 per cent.

Who are the almost two thirds of the FDN's military leaders who are *not* former Guardsmen? In response to your inquiries, I am enclosing a list [see Document 6] of Senior FDN military personnel. It identifies their positions and their previous occupations, including discrepancies when they have come to our attention. It shows that a majority are civilians, that they come from both urban and rural backgrounds, and that many previously served in Sandinista army or militia units.

This brings me to a second key point: the resistance forces have grown steadily since 1982. This means that more people now joining were previously with the Sandinistas than with the Guard, which ceased to exist more than six years ago. It also means that the

FDN's organization and components are themselves constantly changing.

For example, the Jorge Salazar Regional Command began in 1983 as a task force of some 250 men operating in northern Nicaragua. It was effective, it attracted ralliers and grew. It became a regional command. It continued to grow. By November 1985 it had become an operational command with three regional commands and ten task forces; the initial force of 250 fighters had grown to nearly 5,000.

These remarkable increases in fighters and combat units have had a direct impact on the headquarters staff and services their operations require. The Nicaraguan resistance is not a conventional army. It is an irregular army of volunteers, and volunteers follow who they want to follow. Operating in the field against larger Cuban-trained and advised forces, FDN units must of necessity be led by individual commanders who can inspire a following. And the headquarters must not only link these men and the troops they control to each other, it must also act as a link between them and the political leadership in the FDN directorate and now beyond the FDN in UNO. No single component can be said to dominate the resistance movement; all elements must be taken into account.

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Answers to your specific questions follow.

(1) Who served on the ten-member General Staff referred to in Ambassador Motley's letter last April, and who now holds their title or duty?

Ambassador Motley's letter, like the Caucus report, used "general staff" as short-hand for senior headquarters positions. In its early days, the FDN did have an entity called a "General Staff", but it was dissolved in January 1984 as part of a political and military restructuring. The Strategic Command and a variety of specialized services were developed to coordinate as coherently as possible the actions undertaken in the field by the growing number of individual units.

As I noted in my letter to Senator Lugar, a count of the senior headquarters leadership today is not complete unless it includes "all members of the strategic and civil-military commands, all operational commanders, and all chiefs of support services." As of the November 1985 survey, this came to a total of 23 positions. The positions and the 21 individuals occupying them are identified in the enclosed list of FDN military personnel.

(2) Are nine of the ten-member General Staff still, as Ambassador Motley confirmed in the letter, former members of the National Guard?

No. As noted above, there is no "General Staff." Of the 21 individuals in senior headquarters positions as of last November, 12 (including Bermudez) once served in the Guard. A former Sandinista Army officer and eight civilians from professional or technical backgrounds held the other nine positions. As noted in the enclosed list, one former guardsman has been replaced by a civilian since November.

(3) Is Walter "Tono" Calderon Lopez coordinating the regional commands as commander of theater operations?

No. There is no "commander of theater operations". The growth of the FDN forces has been such that no one person coordinates all regional commands. Walter Calderon Lopez, "Tono", still heads the Tactical Operations Command (TOC). But three other commands now operate independently of the TOC and at the same hierarchical level: Operational Command Rafaela Herrera (commanded by a former Lieutenant in the Sandinista armed forces, Encarnacion Baldivia Chavarria, "Tigrillo"); Operational Command Diriangen; and Operational Command Jorge Salazar.

(4) Is "El Venado" serving as G-1, General Staff Commander for personnel?

With the understanding that there is no "General Staff," yes. Harlie Duarte Pichardo, "Venado", is the assistant for personnel in the Strategic Command.

(5) Is "El Toro" serving as G-2 General Staff commander for personnel?

No. I presume question meant to refer to intelligence, which is where the Caucus report located him, and not personnel, covered in question 4 above. The Strategic Command assistant for intelligence is Rodolfo Ampie Quiroz, "Invisible". Donald Torres, "Toro", is in charge of counterintelligence.

(6) Is "Mike Lima" serving as G-3, General Staff commander for operations?

Yes, subject to the same qualifications noted above. The Strategic Command assistant for operations is Luis Moreno Payan, "Mike Lima." Denis Pineda Carcamo, "Benny", was listed in this position in November.

(7) Is Armando "El Policia" Lopez serving as G-4, General Staff commander for logistics?

No. The Strategic Command assistant for logistics is Carlos Jose Guillen Salinas, "Gustavo Pajarito", a former medical student. Armando Lopez, "Policia", left this position last December, and now carries out other logistics functions.

(8) Is "El Invisible" serving as G-5, General Staff commander for logistics?

No. Logistics was dealt with in question 7. I presume this question was meant to refer to "psychological warfare," which is where the Caucus report listed "Invisible". No position was so designated in the November survey. Today, Rodolfo Ampie Quiroz, "Invisible", is Strategic Command assistant for intelligence and commander of a task force.

(9) Is Juan Gomez serving as commander of air operations?

Yes. Juan Gomez, "Juanillo", is the FDN's senior pilot, and is often referred to as head of air operations.

(10) What is the current role in the FDN and whereabouts of Ricardo Lau, who press reports placed in contra camps as recently as last month?

Ricardo Lau, "Chino Lau", left the FDN more than a year and a half ago. He is said to reside in Guatemala. We have no information on his presence in FDN areas this year.

(11) Who commands the 14 regional commands cited in your letter to Senator Lugar, and what is the name of each command?

See enclosed list.

(12) Who commands the 52 task forces cited in your letter to Senator Lugar, and what is the name of each task force?

See enclosed list.

(13) Who are the roughly 75 individuals tabulated in your letter to Senator Lugar who are neither General Staff, regional commanders or task force commanders, and what are their specific duties?

See enclosed list.

(14) What are the positions and who are the occupants of the leadership posts referred to in the chart entitled "Background of FDN Military Leaders: Late 1985" that accompanied Secretary Shultz's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 27?

The chart is based on Table I in my letter to Senator Lugar.

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Let me conclude with two final thoughts on the military and the political aspects of the war in Nicaragua.

The first is that, despite internal shortcomings and the steady growth of the Sandinista armed forces and internal security units in numbers, operational capability, and weaponry, the resistance is militarily viable.

Keeping together some 20,000 fighters is in itself not a small achievement given existing conditions inside and outside Nicaragua. Over the past several years, between one-third and one-half of these fighters have been operating inside Nicaragua at any given time.

The UNO/FDN forces can be considered the "cutting edge" of a broader national resistance movement. This broader movement includes such organizations as:

- UNO/FARN under the leadership of Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro operate small units in the Northern Rio San Juan and Southern Zelaya;
- Sandino Revolutionary Front (ARDE/FRS), under the leadership of Eden Pastora, also operates along the southern region of Nicaragua; and
- UNO/KISAN and MISURASATA Miskito and independent Creole fighters operate from Northern Zelaya to North of Bluefields along the Atlantic Coast.

By 1985 armed resistance forces were engaging in military operations in more than half of Nicaragua's 16 departments. Comparing the areas in which resistance forces operated in 1982-83 with those in which they have been active since 1984-85 reveals a steady expansion, from hit-and-run raids primarily concentrated along the northern Nicaraguan border to multi-taskforce operations in such departments as Matagalpa, Boaco and Chontales in central Nicaragua, including the lengthy presence of some 1500 members of the Jorge Salazar Command in southern Zelaya and along the Rama Road. Some of these areas are as much as 45 days' march from the Honduran border.

While non-FDN forces remain small and are largely organized into small tactical units of 40-70 men, they do continue to make their presence known. The military leaders of these groups are either former Sandinistas or independents. Like the experience within the FDN itself, where former Guardsmen and former Sandinistas fight side by side, the former Sandinistas in these non-FDN forces are increasing their coordination with the FDN in the strengthened political framework of cooperation with UNO.

For a movement some have declared ineffective, defeated, or even dead, the Nicaraguan resistance is displaying a resiliency that is given little recognition by anyone but the Sandinistas.

This brings me to my final point. The United States supports all the major groups in opposition to the Sandinista dictatorship. Our only conditions are that any group we support subscribe to democratic principles, that it respect internationally-accepted standards of conduct and refrain from criminal activity, and that it cooperate with other like-minded groups. In this regard, I am enclosing for your convenient reference a copy of UNO's Declaration of Principles and Objectives, signed in Caracas, Venezuela, on January 22, 1986.

As I wrote Senator Lugar, the people of Nicaragua and the resistance forces are struggling for a future of freedom and peace, and they deserve our support.

Sincerely,

ELLIOTT ABRAMS

Document 4

Selected Biographies of Resistance Leaders

Enrique Bermudez Varela is the military commander of the UNO/FDN armed forces. He is a military engineer who graduated from the Nicaraguan Military Academy and also attended the Agulhas Negras Military Academy in Brazil, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the U.S. Army School of the Americas. From 1976 to 1979, Bermudez served as the Defense Attache in Washington, D.C., and was not involved in or associated with human rights abuses committed during the civil war. Roberto Sanchez, the Sandinista Army spokesman in Managua, noted in December 1982 that Bermudez has never been identified with "war crimes" committed under Somoza. This statement has never been repudiated by the Sandinistas or Sanchez.

Adolfo Calero Portocarrero, a lifelong opponent of Somoza, has been president of the National Directorate of the FDN since December 1983. He began his political career in the 1950s as an activist in the Conservative Party. In 1959 he helped organize managerial strikes in support of an insurrection headed by Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of the opposition daily *La Prensa*. In 1978, Calero served as his party's representative in the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) and was jailed for initiating a general strike against Somoza. A 1978 *New York Times* article described Calero as "the most forceful" of Somoza's opponents. After attempting to cooperate with the Sandinistas, Calero went into exile at the end of 1982. He helped found UNO in 1985. Calero graduated from the University of Notre Dame in 1953, did graduate work in industrial management at Syracuse University, and holds a law degree from the University of Central America in Nicaragua.

Alfredo Cesar Aguirre earned a B.S. degree in industrial relations from the University of Texas and an M.B.A. from Stanford University. After serving as general administrator of the Nicaraguan Sugar Estates, he joined the Sandinistas in 1978 and was tortured and imprisoned by the government during Somoza's last year. After the Sandinista victory in 1979, Cesar became Executive Director of the International Reconstruction Fund. In 1980-81 he was executive director of the Banking Superior Council. In 1981-82 he was president of the Central Bank. After breaking with the Sandinistas, Cesar went into exile in Costa Rica and became an adviser to the Costa Rican Government, specializing in external debt. In mid-1985 he became the most prominent of six founding members of the Southern Opposition Block (BOS).

Fernando Chamorro Rappaccioli, "El Negro," leader of UNO/FARN and commander of ARDE's military forces, has been a prominent anti-Somoza figure since the 1940s. He participated in numerous military actions against the dictator and was repeatedly jailed or exiled by Somoza. During the revolution, he executed a spectacular rocket attack on Somoza's Managua bunker from the nearby Intercontinental Hotel. In 1979, he fought on the southern front with the Sandinistas. The increasingly communist nature of the regime, and the absence of an effort to implement the democratic goals of the revolution, drove Chamorro into exile in 1982 at which time he joined in the founding of ARDE. When Pastora was expelled as a result of policy disputes within the organization, Chamorro became the military leader.

Arturo Jose Cruz Porras was a member of Nicaragua's Governing Junta from May 1980 to March 1981. He was jailed twice by Somoza, once for 3 months and later for 11 months. In

1977, Cruz was invited by the Sandinistas to be one of "The Group of 12," prominent Nicaraguans who would serve as a bridge between the Sandinistas and other groups in the civil opposition to Somoza. A long-time member of the Conservative Party, Cruz is an economist who holds graduate and undergraduate degrees from Georgetown University. He has specialized in development banking and has worked for the Inter-American Development Bank. Following the revolution, Mr. Cruz served as president of the Central Bank in 1979-80, as a member of the governing junta from May 1980 to March 1981, and as Nicaragua's Ambassador to the United States from June 1981 until his resignation in December in protest over Sandinista policies. Cruz was the presidential candidate of the unified opposition Coordinadora Democratica in the November 1984 elections but refused to register his candidacy in protest over the Sandinista government's refusal to permit a fair electoral contest. He helped found UNO in 1985.

Wycliffe Diego is a Miskito Indian leader from the Atlantic Coast town of Puerto Cabezas. He was a Moravian pastor and an active member of the Miskito organization ALPROMISU. He was jailed by Somoza in 1971 for allegedly being a communist. When MISURASATA was formed in 1979, Diego served as a member of its executive board. Reacting to the Sandinista mistreatment of Nicaragua's indigenous population, Diego went into exile and helped found the armed resistance group MISURA. He was wounded in a Sandinista-engineered 1982 assassination attempt and is today a key figure in UNO/KISAN.

Eden Pastora Gomez, the legendary Commander Zero and leader of the ARDE/FRS, was the Sandinistas' most popular hero and a senior official of their government until he distanced himself from them in 1981. In August 1978 Pastora led the unit that captured the National Palace in Managua. That operation gained the release of 59 political prisoners, but its lasting significance was that it captured the imagination of the Nicaraguan people and enabled the Sandinistas to become the symbol of resistance to Somoza. After the fall of Somoza, Pastora became Vice Minister of Interior and then Vice Minister of Defense. In April 1982 he announced his opposition to the Sandinista regime. That same year he was cofounder of ARDE. In April 1983 he took up arms against the Sandinistas in southern Nicaragua.

Brooklyn Rivera Bryan is a Miskito Indian from the Nicaraguan Altantic Coast. He supported the revolution against Somoza and was a founding member of MISURASATA when it was created under Sandinista auspices in 1979. In February 1981, Rivera and other Indian leaders were arrested by the Sandinistas and accused of "counter-revolutionary activities." He was released from jail after a short time and continued to protest Sandinista efforts to nationalize Indian lands and to relocate the Indian population. He resisted efforts to force the "cultural assimilation" of the various Indian groups by the Sandinistas. He was driven into exile and carries on the fight for freedom as head of MISURASATA, now independent of the Sandinistas.

Alfonso Robelo Callejas, political coordinator of ARDE and head of the MDN, was trained as a chemical engineer. He served as director of the University of Central America from 1970 to 1972 and was president of the Nicaraguan Chamber of Commerce until 1975. He then headed the development institute INDE. Following the assassination of *La Prensa* editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Robelo founded the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement, a moderate, democratic-oriented political party of businessmen, industrialists, and professionals opposed to the Somoza regime. After the revolution Robelo was one of the five members of the original 1979 junta. He resigned in 1980 because of the Marxist tendencies in the FSLN-dominated government and the growing Cuban influence in the country. Harassed by the FSLN after his resignation, he was finally forced into exile in 1982, at which time he and Eden Pastora founded the Democratic Alliance. Robelo helped found UNO in 1985.

Indalecio Rodriguez Alaniz, FDN Directorate member in charge of civil affairs. The son of an anti-Somoza figure, he became politically active at an early age. He participated in the anti-Somoza youth movement and became involved in the Independent Liberal Party, ultimately becoming its political secretary. He was jailed twice in the 1950s for anti-Somoza activities. After spending several years abroad, he returned to Nicaragua to accept a position at the University of Central America where he remained during the revolution. In 1981 he abandoned his university post to go into exile and take up the struggle against the Sandinistas. Educated as a veterinarian, Rodriguez has been a professor and university president as well as a cattleman and coffeegrower.

Lucia Cardenal Viuda de Salazar is the widow of Jorge Salazar Arguello, a prominent Nicaraguan businessman who was murdered by the Sandinista security forces in November 1980. She was educated in Catholic schools in Nicaragua and the United States. During the revolution, the Salazars collaborated with the Sandinistas and harbored Sandinista militants who were being sought by Somoza's forces. Her late husband, a top official of the private sector organization Superior Council of Private Enterprise, played a key role in the civic opposition to Sandinista policies in 1980. A progressive and charismatic leader whose popularity was rising, he was shot and killed by Sandinista State Security police who claimed he was participating in a conspiracy. After his murder Mrs. Salazar fled Nicaragua and joined the FDN.

Aristides Sanchez is the FDN Directorate member responsible for logistics. He holds a Doctor of Law degree and graduated in Italy with a specialization in labor law. Cattleman and agriculturalist.

Document 5

UNITED NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES

Under the protection of God and interpreting the hopes of the great majority of people in Nicaragua, who with heroic patriotism shook off the yoke of the previous dictatorship and now suffer the repression by force of arms of new tyrants and foreign intervention;

GIVING HOMAGE:

To the noble sacrifice of the democratic resistance forces which have shed their blood and continue to offer their lives in an unequal war against an army in the service of Soviet imperialism, from which it receives direction, training, weapons and supplies;

To the civic courage and democratic vocation of the political parties, labor and social organizations, ethnic minorities and individuals who have maintained a firm attitude against the abuses of the military tyranny of the Sandinista Front;

AFFIRMING:

That the people of Nicaragua have demonstrated their will to free themselves from the totalitarian regime which oppresses them with the support of foreign forces and the so-called inter-

Components of the UNO/FDN Military Forces

This chart focuses on the headquarters and combat components of military forces of the United Nicaraguan Opposition/Nicaraguan Democratic Force (UNO/FDN) as reported in November 1985. At any given time, organizational and authority relationships can fluctuate because of communications difficulties, dispersal of units, and other operational requirements of the war in Nicaragua.



nationalists, carrying out a painful defensive war and a war of liberation, which have witnessed heroic actions inspired by the highest degree of patriotism on the part of the combatants of the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance and of broad sectors of the population;

RECOGNIZING:

That the courage and sacrifice of different sectors comprising the nation have created, in the face of repression, the conditions for the liberation of Nicaragua, faithful to the historic tradition that has led them to rise up in arms when their freedom and democratic aspirations have been snatched away from them;

CONSIDERING:

The historic democratic determination of the Nicaraguans, translated in the past struggles against the Somoza dynasty and in the present struggle against the totalitarianism of the Sandinista Front, the firm belief in a juridical order and respect for the constitution of the country and the sacrifices for the full exercise of its precepts;

COMMITTED:

To the unrestricted observance of the human rights of all Nicaraguans without exception, the establishment of a State of Law which permits the full development of the individual and the promotion of social justice;

RECOGNIZING:

That the tragic situation of Nicaragua, embroiled in chaos as a consequence of the present dictatorship, requires the adoption of special and urgent measures in the political, economic and social arenas which guarantee the quick and orderly transition toward a democratic State, by means of a Provisional Government of a duration strictly limited by the needs of the transition;

REAFFIRMING:

Our commitment to peace and democracy contained in the Pronouncements of San Jose of March 1, 1985, of San Salvador of June 12, 1985, and our support for the calls for National Dialogue demanded by the Democratic Coordinator and the Nicaraguan Bishops Conference;

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT:

The civil war of Nicaragua, which threatens the peace of the region and of the American continent, brought about by the failure of the military tyranny of the Sandinista Front to fulfill the resolutions of the XVII Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting of the Organization of American States of June 23, 1979 which, in an action which set a precedent in our continent, explicitly withdrew its recognition of one of the member governments in order to grant it to an insurgent force, which committed itself to establish democracy and respect the human rights of all Nicaraguans without exception;

CONVINCED:

That the solidarity and reconciliation of all Nicaraguans, as well as the support and understanding of the peoples and governments of the free world, will contribute effectively to the creation of the indispensable conditions so that a democratic and pluralistic process is established which guarantees peace, sovereignty and freedom to our people;

THEREFORE:

On behalf of the Directorate of the United Nicaraguan Opposition and with the full support of its Permanent Advisory Committee, we propose to the Nicaraguan people and inform our sister Latin American nations and the democratic governments of the world, while at the same time requesting their support and solidarity, the Principles and Objectives of a Provisional Government of National Reconciliation.

PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES

I. Regarding the Political System:

1. To democratize Nicaragua, guaranteeing and promoting political pluralism and the participation of all citizens at the local and national level, through the exercise of representative democracy, respecting their ethnic, cultural and religious values;

2. To establish a political system which guarantees the separation and independence of the powers of the government;

3. To establish a rule of law which assures the equality of the citizens before the law; respect for, the full exercise of, and effective development of Human Rights through the independence of the Judicial Power; giving guarantees to national Human Rights organizations, and adhering strictly to international obligations deriving from written agreements;

4. To guarantee the strictest respect for freedoms, especially those of speech, association, worship and unions with respect for agreements numbers 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization, such as the undeniable right to strike;

5. To recognize the primacy of Civil Society over the State and the achievement of the common good as its principal objective;

6. To create an autonomous electoral system which guarantees representative democracy and respect for the popular will, freely expressed in periodic elections, assuring alternability in office, through the principle of non re-election.

7. To promulgate a Civil Service Law, establishing the administrative career. There will be created the National Comptrollership Commission to guarantee the efficient and honest use of public funds and State resources;

8. To abolish any and all types of capital punishment and to eliminate permanently and unequivocally the special tribunals which have been abusively created by the Sandinista Front;

9. To decree a General Amnesty for political and related common crimes, as an expression of the process of rehabilitation and reconciliation, without exception;

10. To recognize the historic rights of the indigenous peoples of Nicaragua, adopting special administrative and developmental measures in order to accelerate the progress of the Atlantic Coast; fostering the participation of its people in matters affecting the region, preserving their cultural identity and strengthening the nationality and territorial integrity of the Nation;

11. To demilitarize society by subjecting the military to the civil authority, proceeding to dismantle military, para-military and security organizations and the organizations of repressive nature of the Sandinista regime;

12. To create a National Army in the service of the Nation and the defense of its sovereignty, of adequate proportions for those objectives and composed principally of those Freedom Fighters who wish to serve professionally and loyally in democratic institutions, and by other Nicaraguans who also meet the conditions of moral character. No person with a record of human rights violations will be able to become a part of the new National Army.

II. Socio-Economic Affairs:

1. To recognize the family as the basis of society, making its protection a fundamental objective of the Government of Reconciliation;

2. To give preferential use of state resources to satisfy basic human needs: especially employment, food, health, education and housing;

3. To assure that education responds to the fundamental principles of freedom of instruction and the right of parents to select the best for their children. The preservation and the development of culture and sports will be an important

part of the programs of teaching, outreach and information.

4. To carry out an integral agrarian reform, which responds to the natural right of private property, taking into account efficiency in the utilization of resources and the utility of giving land to those who work it;

5. To establish a new social contract, democratically adopted, which recognizes the equitable participation of all sectors of civil society, both in effort as well as in benefits;

6. To provide immediate assistance to the victims of the civil war, providing programs which permit their rehabilitation and economic security;

7. To adopt measures which facilitate full participation in productive civilian life by combatants who do not join the new army and national police;

8. To promote and facilitate the return of exiles through programs to finance the creation of jobs and the adoption of legal, economic and customs measures and other incentives;

9. To formulate and execute an immediate program of action and the securing of resources for the reordering and reactivation of the national economy and the providing of jobs for the Nicaraguan people;

10. To abolish state centralism and return to the private sector all those productive, commercial and service activities which said sector is able to carry out more efficiently for the common good;

11. The Government of Reconciliation, as guarantor of the common good and social peace, will observe and promote the principles of: social justice, freedom of association, work as a source of well-being and wealth, the indispensable contribution of laborers and peasants to the development of the country, as well as solidarity with the less favored sectors of the population, private property as the expression of a natural right and the sovereignty of Nicaragua over its natural resources;

12. To consolidate and perfect the Central American Common Market and to promote foreign investment as important measures to bring about socio-economic development.

III. Foreign Policy:

To adopt a foreign policy which protects the peace and strengthens the independence and sovereignty of the Nation, founded on the principles of the inter-American system; supported in the fulfillment of international accords, cooperation and friendly relations, especially with those countries which practice representative democracy, and in the permanent determination to contribute to the economic, social and political integration of the Central American fatherland.

IV. Plan and Program:

A Program of Government will be presented for the consideration of a consultative body in which will be represented the various democratic, political, social and labor organizations which will implement these principles. It will establish the procedures so that, by the eighth month after the installation of the new Government of Reconciliation, it will hold elections for a Constituent Assembly. After eighteen months it will hold general elections with guarantees to assure the free participation of all citizens and the integrity of the elections.

Among the preferred objectives to be considered by the consultative body should be the following: Reorganization of the Judicial Power; Municipal Autonomy; reorganization and integrity of Public Administration; health and social security; education; culture; housing; transportation; infrastructure; sports; policies of incentives for the various productive sectors; the financial system; agrarian reform; commerce; foreign investment; reduction of the foreign debt; fiscal, monetary and credit policies, giving special attention to the development of cooperatives and the balanced action of the State.

We reiterate that the liberation of our fatherland requires the participation of all the democratic sectors of the Nicaraguan people, as well as the solidarity and support of the peoples and governments of the countries of the Americas and the other free peoples of the world.

At the same time, we pledge ourselves to respect the consensus of Nicaragua's democratic spectrum in the selection of those who will implement the initial task of national reconstruction. Furthermore, we pledge ourselves to assure that it shall be the people, by means of an electoral process in full enjoyment of their rights and freedoms, who will elect the Constituent Assembly and, later, the national authorities.

Caracas, Venezuela, Cradle of Liberator Simon Bolivar, the twenty-second day of January of Nineteen Eighty-six.

Arturo Cruz Alfonso Robelo
Adolfo Calero

Document 6

Senior FDN Military Personnel

Positions and their occupants are as of the November 1985 survey utilized for compiling the data in Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams' letter of February 24, 1986, to Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.

Personnel changes or discrepancies identified as of February 1986 are explicitly noted. Spellings are not necessarily authoritative. Italics indicate previous occupation. Note that several individuals occupy more than one position.

KEY

★ Former Sandinista
■ Former National Guard (*Guardia Nacional*–GN)
○ Civilian
□ Previous occupation unknown

CIVIL-MILITARY JUNTA

○ Adolfo Calero Portocarrero, President of the FDN Directorate.[1]
■ Enrique Bermudez Varela, "Comandante 380," FDN Directorate member and military commander, *GN colonel.*[1]
○ Indalecio Rodriguez, FDN Directorate member in charge of civil affairs.[1]
○ Aristides Sanchez, FDN Directorate member responsible for logistics.[1]

Office of Finance

○ Orlando Montealegre, "Oscar Montes," *graduate in business administration.*

Office of Legal Affairs

○ Carlos Icaza, "Sofonias," *Doctor of Law.*

STRATEGIC COMMAND

■ Enrique Bermudez (see Civil-Military Junta).
■ Harlie Duarte Pichardo, "Venado," assistant for personnel, *GN sublieutenant.*
■ Rodolfo Ernesto Ampie Quiroz, "Invisible," assistant for intelligence, *GN lieutenant.*

[1]See biography in Document 4.

■ Denis Pineda Carcamo, "Benny," assistant for operations, *GN sublieutenant.* (Replaced since November by Luis Alfonso Moreno Payan, "Mike Lima," *GN sublieutenant.*)

■ Armando Lopez, "L-26" or "Policia," assistant for Logistics, *GN lieutenant.* (Replaced since November by Carlos Jose Guillen Salinas, "Gustavo Pajarito," *medical student.*)

○ Sebastian Flores, "Q-25," assistant for communications, *civilian radio technician.*

SUPPORT SERVICES

Logistics

○ Mario Sacasa, "Romano," *graduate in economics.*

○ Rodolfo Robles, "Raul," *public accountant.*

○ Ramon Selva, "Marcel," *graduate in agriculture.*

○ Agustin Bodan, "Pincho," *agricultural engineer.*

■ Abel Ignacio Cespedes, "Ciro," *GN lieutenant colonel.*

Civil Affairs

○ Carlos Icaza (see Office of Legal Affairs).

○ Jaques Pearson, "Jaques," *civilian professional.*

○ Oscar Sugranes, "Oscar," *civilian professional.*

Communications

○ Frank Arana, "Cosaco," *graduate in business administration.*

Medical

■ Ernesto Matamoros, "Dr. Tomas," military physician, *GN lieutenant colonel.*

○ Otto Mojica, "Dr. Jacinto," odontologist.

○ Salvador Marin, "Dr. Francisco," physician and surgeon.

○ Jose Plazahola, "Dr. Jose," physician and surgeon.

○ Garry Britton, "Dr. Awas Tara," physician and surgeon.

○ Pablo Rivas, "Dr. Pinto," physician and surgeon.

○ Jose Quintana, "Dr. Rafael," physician and surgeon.

○ Francisco Rugama, "Dr. Ruben," physician and surgeon.

○ Pedro Mora, "Dr. Orlando," physician and surgeon.

○ Rodrigo Lezama, "Dr. Lezama," physician and surgeon.

Air Force

■ Juan Gomez, "Juanillo," commander, *GN colonel.*

■ Arnaldo Arana, "Tejano," subcommander, *GN captain.*

■ Guillermo Gomez, "Memo," pilot, *GN sublieutenant.*

■ Oscar Porras Aragon, "Pancho," pilot, *GN sublieutenant.*

○ Manuel Mairena Rivas, "Manuel," pilot, *civilian.*

○ Frank Stadthagen, "Frank," pilot, *civilian.*

○ Carlos Vargas Lopez, "Carlos," pilot, *civilian.*

○ Arnaldo Antonio Blanco, "Arnaldo," pilot, *civilian.*

○ Jose Ernesto Santillana Mendoza, "Tito," pilot, *civilian.*

○ Camilo Gonzalez Lopez, "Camilo," pilot, *civilian.*

○ Wilfredo Gutierrez, "Wilfredo," pilot, *civilian.*

○ Jaime Lau, "Jaime," pilot, *civilian.*

○ Guillermo Osorio, "Guillermo," pilot, *civilian.*

○ Ramon Zuniga, "Ramon," pilot, *civilian.*

○ Henri H. Motino, "Henri," pilot, *civilian.*

○ Jose Jimenez Cruiz, "Jose," pilot, *civilian.*

★ Gustavo Quezada, "Waiki," pilot, *Sandinista Popular Army sublieutenant.*

■ Juan Jose Zelaya Jarquin, "Genaro," air intelligence assistant, *GN major.*

○ Gilberto Jiron, "Gilberto," mechanic, *civilian.*

Naval Force

■ Isidro Sandino, "Jose Alvarado," commander, *GN colonel.*

Counterintelligence

■ Donald Torres, "Toro," officer in charge, *GN major.*

REGIONAL COMMANDS

NICARAO

■ Jose Benito Bravo Centeno, "Mack," commander, *GN sergeant.*

■ Filemon Espinales Aguilar (or Aguilera), "4-2," executive officer, *GN sergeant* (not identified at time of November survey).

Task Force Pedro Joaquin Chamorro

■ Filemon Espinales Aguilar (or Aguilera), commander (see Regional Command Nicarao).

Task Force Comandante Omar

■ Jose Camilo Vasquez Tercero, "Samuel," commander, *GN soldier* (since identified as farmer).

Task Force Monimbo

■ Miguel Angel Hernandez Calderon, "Ocran," *GN soldier.*

SEGOVIA

○ Manuel Adan Rugama Acevedo, "Aureliano," commander, *civilian physician and surgeon.*

★ Jose Maria Rodriguez Espinoza, "Segovia," executive officer *Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) sublieutenant.*

Task Force Yali

○ Fancisco Montenegro Cruz, "Nelson," *farmer.*

★ Feliciano Flores Rivera, "Mano Negra," executive officer, *Sandinista Popular Militia (MPS) soldier.*

Task Force Ruben Dario

○ Amado Tercero Castro, "Rojito," commander, *farmer.*

Task Force Subtiava

★ Rodolfo Garcia Castro, "Nortiel," commander, *EPS sublieutenant.*

★ Teodoro Altamirano, "Egdoro," executive officer, *MPS soldier.*

Task Force Jicaro

○ Marcial Sanchez Carrasco, "Sacarias," commander, *cattleman.*

○ Ricardo Galindo Urbina, "Rufo," executive officer, *cattleman.*

SAN JACINTO

■ Francisco (or Jose Federico) Ruiz Castellon, "Renato," commander, *GN lieutenant.*

■ Marlon Blandon Osorno, "Gorrion," executive officer, *GN sublieutenant* (not listed since November).

Task Force Rigoberto Cabezas

■ Gerardo Martinez, "Chaco," commander, *GN sublieutenant* (not listed since November).

■ Guillermo Yobanks Soliz, "Jhonny," executive officer, *GN sergeant.*

Task Force Xolotlan

■ Javier Gomez Ortega, commander, "Willi" or "Willy," *GN sublieutenant.*

■ Jose Aguirrez Garcia, "Chino 4," executive officer, *GN corporal* (since identified as Regional Command executive officer and Task Force Rigoberto Cabezas commander).

15 OF SEPTEMBER

★ Luis Fley Gonzales, "Jhonson," commander, *EPS soldier* (since identified as Task Force Raul Arroliga commander).

★ Simeon Aguirrez Torrez, "Kaliman," executive officer, *Department of State Security (DGSE) official* (since identified as Task Force Armando Blancher commander).

Task Force Raul Arroliga

○ Rafael Amador Altamirano, "Canario," commander (since identified as executive officer), *farmer.*

★ Melido Tinoco Villagra, "Wilmor," executive officer, *EPS sergeant* (not listed since November).

Task Force Armando Blancher

○ Santos Ramon Zeledon Rivera, "Wilfredo," commander (since identified as executive officer), *farmer.*

○ Cosme Castillo Moran, "Ronald," executive officer, *farmer* (not listed since November).

OPERATIONAL COMMANDS

Rafaela Herrera

★ Encarnacion Baldivia Chavarria, "Tigrillo," commander, *EPS sublieutenant.*

★ Rufo Cesar Zeledon Castilblanco, "Rolando," executive officer, *EPS sergeant* (not identified at time of November survey).

Task Force San Miguel

★ Rufo Cesar Zeledon Castilblanco, "Rolando," commander (see above).

○ Eduardo Vargas Callos, "Wilfredo," executive officer, *chauffeur.*

REGIONAL COMMAND JUAN CASTRO CASTRO

★ Jose Danilo Galeano Rodas, "Tiro al Blanco," commander, *EPS soldier.*

★ Amadeo Rivera Marin, "Ismael Antonio," executive officer, *EPS soldier* (not identified at time of November survey).

Task Force Francisco Rodriguez

★ Jose Santos Aguilera Sanchez, "Gavilan," commander, *farmer* (identified since November as having served in the Sandinista army or militia).

Task Force Pablo Ruiz

○ Francisco Ruiz Garcia, "Camaron," commander, *farmer.*

Task Force Felipe Cornejo

○ Commander position is vacant (filled since November by Thomas Luis Manzanares Torrez, "Leoncillo," *farmer*).

■ Francisco Palma Salinas, "Perdido," executive officer, *GN soldier.*

REGIONAL COMMAND ALONSO IRIAS

★ Abelardo Zelaya Chavarria, "Ivan," commander, *EPS soldier.*

Task Force Matilde Cruz

○ Santiago Silas Zamora, "Lobo," commander, *farmer* (not listed since November).

■ Antonio Moncada Blandon, "Gato Negro," executive officer, *GN private* (identified since November as commander).

Task Force Albino Molina

★ Dionisio Benavidez Lopez, "Solin," commander, *EPS soldier* (since promoted to executive officer of Regional Command Alonso Irias).

○ "Catala" (true name unknown in November, identified since as Santos Rojas Torrez, "Catalita") executive officer (since promoted to commander), *farmer.*

REGIONAL COMMAND ANDRES CASTRO

★ Francisco Baldivia Chavarria, "Dimas de Tigrillo," commander, *EPS soldier.*

○ Isidro Hermes Garcia Gonzalez, "Pata de Fierro," executive officer, *MPS soldier* (since identified as farmer).

Task Force Mercedes Benavides

★ Jose Fausto Picardo Castillo, "Richard," commander, *MPS soldier* (since identified as EPS soldier).

○ Pablo Fajardo, "Selva," executive officer, farmer.

Task Force Juan Flores

○ Candelario Rivas, "Marlon," commander, *EPS soldier* (since identified as *farmer*).

○ Monico Mercedes Rivas, "Ivan," executive officer, *EPS soldier* (since identified as *farmer*).

Task Force Leonardo Palma

★ Santos Ricardo Aguilar Cornejo, "Leoncillo II," commander, *farmer* (since identified as having served in the MPS).

○ Juan Pastor Salgado Cornejo (or Aguilar), "320," executive officer, *farmer.*

Task Force Alonso Ramos Castro

○ Cruz Matey Olivas, "Augusto," commander, *farmer.*

○ Evernet Arauz Tinoco, "Dumas," executive officer, *farmer.*

Diriangen

■ Luis Alfonso Moreno Payan, "Mike Lima," commander (see Strategic Command).

■ Denis Pineda Carcamo, "Benny," executive officer (see Strategic Command).

Task Force Larry McDonald

★ Fremio Isabel Altamirano Montenegro, "Jimileo," commander, *farmer* (since identified as *EPS soldier*).

■ Maximo Rodriguez Martinez, "Wilmer," executive officer, *GN corporal.*

REGIONAL COMMAND SALVADOR PEREZ

★ Oscar Manuel Sobalvarro Garcia, "Ruben," commander, *EPS soldier.*

★ Concepcion Anibal Rivera Arauz, "Isaias," executive officer, *EPS soldier.*

Task Force Maritza Zeledon

○ Julio Cesar Sobalvarro Garcia, "Danilo," commander, *farmer* (since identified as *businessman*).

Task Force Miguel Pineda Rizo

★ Jacinto Tercero, "Campeon," commander, *EPS sublieutenant.*

Task Force Fermin Espinoza

★ Luis Armando Sobalvarro Garcia, "Jhonny," commander, *Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) political delegate* (since identified as *coffee grower*).

○ Juan Angel Rivera Huete, "Jubenal," executive officer, *student.*

REGIONAL COMMAND SANTIAGO MEZA

○ Justo Pastor Meza Aguilar (or Peralta), "Denis," commander, *farmer.*
○ Rito Perez Mejia, "Hombrito" or "Fonor," executive officer, *farmer.*

Task Force Macondo

○ Pedro Leonardo Cardenas Olivas (or Martinez), "Deglis," commander, *farmer.*

Task Force Julio Meza

○ Cristobal Meza Peralta, "Omaro," commander, *farmer* (or *cattleman*).
○ Apolinas Bustamante, "Cain," executive officer, *farmer.*

REGIONAL COMMAND PEDRO JOAQUIN GONZALEZ

★ Rudy Zelaya Zeledon, "Douglas," commander, *EPS soldier.*
○ Juan Ramon Medina Ramos, "Medina," executive officer, *farmer* (since identified as *businessman*).

Task Force Managua

○ Juan Agustin Blandon Carbajal, "Bladimir," commander, *farmer.*
○ Benicio Gonzalez Perez, "Gorgojo," executive officer, *farmer.*

Task Force Yorlan Ubeda

○ Jose Balladares, "Chepito," commander, *farmer.*
★ Horacio Castro Salgado, "Fernando," executive officer, *EPS soldier.*

Jorge Salazar

■ Juan Rivas Romero, "Quiche," commander, *GN sergeant.*

REGIONAL COMMAND JORGE SALAZAR I

○ Tirzo Ramon Moreno Aguilar, "Rigoberto," commander, *student.*
○ Antonio Chavarria Rodriguez, "Dumas," executive officer, *evangelical pastor.*

Task Force Tipitapa

■ Jhonn Santiago Lopez Lopez, "Honda Lopez," commander, *GN corporal.*

Task Force Chontales

○ Felix Garcia Hernandez, "Alis," commander, *farmer* (since identified as evangelical pastor).

Task Force Masaya

○ Denis Galeano Cornejo, "Jhonny," commander, *farmer.*

Task Force Emanuel Mongalo

■ Rafael Leontes Areas Bolano, "Atila," commander, *GN private.*

REGIONAL COMMAND JORGE SALAZAR II

○ Israel Galeano Cornejo, "Franklin," commander, *farmer.*
★ Angel Soza, "Emiliano," executive officer, *EPS soldier.*

Task Force Filemon Membreno

○ Angel Soza, "Emiliano," commander.

Task Force Salvador Mendieta

□ Guadalupe Vallecillo, "Capulina," commander, *previous occupation unknown.*"

Task Force Hermenegildo Gonzalez

○ Alfredo Galeano Cornejo, "David," commander, *farmer.*

REGIONAL COMMAND JORGE SALAZAR III

○ Diogenes Membreno Hernandez, "Fernando," commander, *evangelical pastor.*

Task Force Camoapa

□ "Jose," true name unknown, commander, *previous occupation unknown.*

Task Force Jose Santo Morales

□ "Oliver," true name unknown, commander, *previous occupation unknown.*

Task Force Jeane Kirkpatrick

□ "Oswaldo," true name unknown, commander, *previous occupation unknown.*

REGIONAL COMMAND JOSE DOLORES ESTRADA

■ Marcos Orlando Navarro Carrasco, "Dimas Negro," commander, *GN sergeant* (since identified as *private*).
■ Jose Abel Hernandez Gutierrez, "Orion," executive officer, *GN corporal* (since identified as *private*).

Task Force Commandante Rudy

■ Gumercindo Lopez Rojas, "Principe," commander, *GN soldier.*

Task Force Oscar Montenegro

★ Noel Gomez Jimenez, "Jaguar," commander, EPS sublieutenant.

Tactical Operations Command

■ Walter Calderon Lopez, "Tono," commander, *GN lieutenant.*
○ Victor Sanchez Herdocia, "Licenciado," executive officer, *graduate in business administration.*

Task Force Grupo Griego

■ Guillermo Lopez Arguello, "Poffi," commander, *GN sublieutenant.*

Task Force Grupo Oswaldo

■ Francisco Orozco Gutierrez, "Naval," commander, *GN soldier.*

Task Force Grupo Gamaliel

★ Marcos Benavidez, "Tapada," commander, *EPS soldier.*

Task Force Grupo Miguel Angel Rodriguez

★ Pastor Palacios Zamora, "Indio," commander, *EPS soldier.*

Independent Task Forces and Groups

Task Force Quilali

★ Freddy Montenegro Gadea Zeledon, "Coral," commander, *EPS soldier.*
○ Roberto Alonso Martinez Noboa, "Nolan," executive officer, *student.*

Task Force Independencia

■ Rodolfo Ernesto Ample Quiroz, commander (see Strategic Command)
■ Filadelfo Rivas, "Jose," executive officer, *GN sublieutenant.*

Task Force Military Police

■ Mariano Esteban Morales Canales, "Leo," commander, *GN sergeant.*
○ Rene Danilo Jarquin Icabalzeta, "Honda 2," executive officer, *primary school teacher.*

Grupo Comandante Griego

■ Jose Quintin Espinales Guevara, "0-3," commander, *GN sergeant.*

○ Raul de Jesus Ortez Sandres, "Kaibil," executive officer, *farmer.*

Special Operations Command

○ Carlos Jose Guillen Salinas, "Gustavo Pajarito," commander (see Strategic Command).

○ Denis Diaz Alfaro, "Isaac," subcommander, *engineering student.*

Artillery Unit

■ Erick Bohnenblust, "Roberto," commander, *GN sublieutenant.*

Naval Force (Riverine)

★ Tito Antonio Baldivia Zelaya, "Abel," commander, *EPS soldier.*

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*Area delineations are approximations based on the 1984-1985 military operations of UNO/FDN, UNO/KISAN, UNO/FARN, ARDE/FRS, MISURASATA, and Creole units.

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